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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
.J 1~ROME B. GUIN AND,
Plaintiff-Re:->pundent,
-vs.p AUL 'J'. W AL'J'ON and 'J'HOMAS Case No. 11153
F. KEARNS dba vVALTONKEARNS,
Defenda11t:->-Appellants.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMEN'l' OF 'J'HE KIND OF CASE
Respondent initiated this action claiming by a written instrument dated January 2, 1962 an interest in oil
and gas lea::H"S and other property owned by WaltonKearns, a partnership, and for an accounting.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COUR'L'
The action was tried to the court without a jury. The
writing sued upon by plaintiff was held unenforceable
because of its being vagne-, not :mfficiently definite and
not supported by any consideration (R. 46). Plaintiff
was granted a 3% sale~ commission and an accounting.
On a theory not disclosed by the pleadings or pretrial
order and independent of the writing sued upon, plaintiff
was declared to be the owner of 10% of the interest held
by the partnership in all least>s and mineral interests as
of May 31, 1965, the date upon which he terminated his
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employment with \Valton-Kearm;. An accounting was
ordered with rderenCl' to such holdings and for such
of the interests as might have been sold since the last
mentioned date. Appellant's motion for a new trial was
overruled and denied on December 27, 19G7 (R. 61-GG) and
this appeal ( R. 67 -68) followed.

RELIEF 80UGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants, hereinafter ref erred to as defendants,
do not question the ruling to the effect that the instrument
sued upon by the plaintiff was a nullity and not supported
by a consideration, nor do they complain of the connnissions awarded plaintiff. In the context of the pleadings,
the pretrial order and the evidence before the court at
the time of the last Memorandum Decision (R. 52), the
judgment giving plaintiff a 10% interest in oil and gas
leaseholds was a gratuity and not within the issues. This
court should modify the judgment ac{;ordingly. In the alternative the cause ;;;l10uld be remanded for a new trfal
with defendants given the 01Jportunity to recast their
pleadings in the defense of the new theory asserted by
plaintiff.

i::;rrATEMJ£N'l1 OF FACTS
a co-partner:ship, consisting of Paul
T. Walton and Thomas F. Kearns, the latter since deceased, was in existence as of N overnber 1, 1955, engaged
in the business of acquiring and exploiting lands and
leaseholds for oil, gas and other hydrncarbons and in all
matters incidental thereto (R. 12).
~Walton-Kearns,
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.J l'l'Ullll' B. Oui11a11d, plaintii'f-n·spundPnt, was ernpluyeJ by the partm•rship at a salar.v of $600.00 a month
from Novernber l, 195G through Decembl"r :31, 1957;
$(j(JO.OU a month from J anuar~· 1, El5~ through Februar~·
1959 and. $735.UO a month from ~larch 1, 1959 until May
31, 1905 (R. 13-14). Without obligation so to do (R. 199:200), Uuinand continm·d in the employment of the part1wnd1ip as a landrnan until his volnntar~· termination
on May 31, 1905 (R 109-110) ). In 1957 in a conversation
with Paul T. \V alton, it was understood. that Uuinand
would rt>n•iv<=' some additional compensation b~· way of a
:i3 salt•s eomrnission on kasl's sold IJ~· him from April 9
or that yt>ar ( R. 11 G-117).
'l'he instnnueut Jat<:•d .January :2, 1962 attached to
plaintiff's original comvlaint (R. 3) continued to be the
crux of plaintiff\; aetion and \\·as adopted by reference
hy paragraph 3 of the amended complaint (R. 9), the
plaintiff allPging tJ1at by the instrnment he "'became the
owne1· of an undivided 10/'o iukrPst in the partnership,
subject to plaintiff's proportionate share of the partnership indebtedness, tlH· value of said interest to be determined, both as to all as:,wts and liabilities, as of the date
of h•nnination of plaintiff's Plllplo~·rnent with the partnership."

'l'lH· writing of January 2, 19():2, was admittedly signl~d by the defendants bnt tlwy dPny that it was bargained
!"or or support(•d by an:• C'onsidt>ration or that it was
l'Xl'l'llkd aml clvlivvn·d as au indun·111ent to plaintiff to
n·main in thl' t'llllJloynH·ut of the partuershi1J or for past
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serviees allegedly rrndered to the partnership by the
plaintiff. It is contt>nded that the writing of January 2,
1962 is so vague a::,; to be unrnforceable; that it lacks
consideration and that it is nothing more than an agre<c'rnent to agree i11 die futme (R. 40-44).
Plaintiff did not contribute any of the capital to
Walton-Keams and lw could han (1uit at any time; he
continued to \rnrk for \Yalton-Krnrns after January :2,
1962 but he "didn't hm·e to" (R 199-200). He was on the
payroll and reportl•d his income on the normal vV-2 form
(Bxhibit P-8). He never varticipat(;d in partnership affairs; >vas never fo;ted as a partner of \Valton-Kearns
and had no \·oice or responsibility in the management of
the affairs of the partnership (R. 184).
'l'he writing of January 2, 1962 (Bxhibit P-3) was
handed to plaintiff in the office of vValton- Kearns (R.
183) and was preceded by J<~xhibit D-4. This Exhibit
shows intPrlirn•ations crm;sed out, written oYer and substituted for language contained in what is marked as Exhibit B (R. 31) attached to dl•fendants' motion for summary judgment (R. 27-32). 'l'he interlineations and all of
the strikeouts and crossovers on Exhibit D-4 are in the
handwriting of plaintiff (R 180). By comparison, the
writing dated .January 2, 1962 duplicated verbatim Bxhibit D-4, giving effect to the alterations made by plaintiff. The L'Volution of the January 2, 1962 writing is clearly and without dispute pointed out hy tlw thn'(' (•xhihits
attached to <ldenclants' motion for smmnary judgme11t
(R. 30-32).
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'l'h<> im.;tnmwnt as 01·igi11ally dralkd (K :31) contemplated t\\·u irnportaut as11ecb: (1) that the interest to be
acc1nired, whakver it might rw, \\·as geared to a time for
so long as Uuinand, the plaiutifL might devote his undivided tii11e and e11ergil'::i to the business of the partnership; (2) that upon termination of the employment for
any cau::>e whatsol•ver, the interest would be determined
as of said time and snd1 interPsts as may ltan· theretofore
been n·stl·d ·would Jwco11w Guinand's separate property;
and ( :3) that the interest would be subject to the repayment of all capital contributions to Messrs. \Valton and
KParns.

The instnm1l'11t as interlim~d by <Juinand, both by
way of addition and subtraction, takes out the requirement of repayment of all capital contributions made by
Messrs. Walton and Kearns, takes out the words "upon
dissolution" and the requirement that plaintiff devote his
undivided time. It is then provided that when Guinand
termina t(•s his employment, his interest ''in the partnership busim·ss will be detl'nnined and discharged as of said
time \\·ithout resulting in a dissolution of the partnership."
'l'he \\'riting of .January :.:'., 1%~ (.1£xhibit P-3) purports to confinn the ownershiIJ of an nndivided 10% interest in the "partnel'Ship" to inelude and not to be in
addition to the nn·ions interests from time to time theretofore acquired by plaintiff. 'l'he impossibility of plaintiff's positio11 in daimi11g to lw a te11a11t iu eo11m1011
with l't>SlJl'd to au undivided 10'/~ iutl·rPst in the proper-
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ties held by the partnershi]J and yet maintaining the integrity of the language "without a clit>ssolution of the
partnership" is a]Jparent. It was early recognized by
the defendants at least. that the agreement as re-drafted
by Guinand "die! not mean anything" and that there would
have to be a. final agreement when and if Guinan<l ever
terminated his employment (R. 164).
r:l'he evidenct• is in conflict as to tlw time, place and
circumstance of the interlineations on Exhibit D-4. Defendant vValton testified that Guinand made the interlineations at the latter's desk in the office of vValtonKt:•arns (R. 161-Hi4). Guinand te1:1tified that certain of
the interlineations were made at the dictation of counsel
and that all of the interlineations were made in counsel's
office (R. 180-182). Uncontradicted testimony is to the
effect that Guinand wanted to be a partner, defendant
Walton 1rnnted Guinand to be a partner but that .Mr.
Kearns did not agree. Mr. Kearns did not want to open
up the partnership to another person (R. 156).
11he findings, etc. and judgment a]Jpealed from retain the concept that the writing dated January 2, 1962
"is so vague as to be Lunenforceable] and is not sufficiently definite as to be construed from its four corners"
(R. 54) and that the same "is not supported by considm·ation" (R. 54). The trial court misconceived the parol
evidence rnlt> and this resnltt>d in the gratuities contained
in tlw judgment ap1wal<><l from.
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POINT I.
THE SUB ST ANT IVE ASPECT OF THE P AROL EVIDENCE RULE HAS BEEN MISAPPLIED.

\\'p are vlagiarizing on McCurinick

Ull

Evidence,

Sectiom; 213-220 on this subjeet.
WhPn the trial court n,opened the iustant case for
fmther evidence addnced at the 8eptember lGth hearing
it did so over the objections to the t>ffect that no extrinsic
evidence \Yas admissible with referenee to the January
:2, 19G2 instrument (H. 150). JlcCormick on Evidence in
Section 217 calls attention to the rule of Integration which
makes the written instrnment the sole repository of the
legal transaction in the sense that the transaction must be
derived from tlu~ written terms alone. In the instant
matter the writtl·n transadion \Vas ignored as witnessed
by the fact that the trial court adhered to its former ruling that thP writing was incapable of interpretation and
was without consideration. Ont of the belly of the Trojan
Horse came something entirely unexpected and the sub:-:;tantive aspect of the parol evidence rule was entirely
ignored. If we do not oversimplify the problem, the
tinestion is whether the parties intended to have the
terms of their agTet,m<:·nt embraced in the written instrulllPnt. lf the writing contains the entire agreement and
was intended as such, then the process of interpretation
is one for tlw court and not for the trier of the fact:
''rl'lw distinctiou betwl·en such interpretative
l'\'itknce en•n where it co11sists of expressions of
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tlH>, parties to tlw instnunent, and evidence of snd1
l'X}Jl'essiom; when offered to be used as a part of
the contract, deed or other transaction, and hence
prohibited by the Parol Evidence Rule, is clear.
The om· tnw of t>vidence eonct•des tlH· supremacy of thl'. 'niting and merely seeks to illuminate its meaning. The other seeks to displace,
or annex itself to, the writing." (McConnick 011
Evidence, Section 217).

ln the instant matter tlH~ fact that the trial court
adhered to its pn•vious memoranda and found that the
January :2, 196:2 ·writing was incapable of interpretation
and lacked consideration, makes it cn·stal clear that the
extrinsic evidence admitted and hdd to be persuasive
was in reality of the Trojan Horse character because it
neither added to nor detracted from the agreement sued
upon. It interjected, that is the t)Xtrinsic evidence, a new
theory and claim. JlcCon11ick 011 h'vidcncc, Section :2:20,
states in part:
"The traditional vi PW is that such declarations
should be rejected because they would be likely
to lw used not 11wrel>- for thP legitimate purpose of
ascPrtaining the rneaning of tht• final writing, but
rather would he used in the substitution for the
writing. Thus, to supersede the writing by the outsidl,, expressions would violate the spirit of tht.·
Parol Evidem'.P HulP, and would offrnd thl' polic»
of the statutes requiring wills and conveyancPs
to he in writing."
In tlw n·ry rt-·cent case· of Oil Shale Corporatioti v.
Larson, 438 P.:2d 640 (l~tah 1!1G8) this comt dt>alt with
the suhjt>e1 ot' tlH· parol evidencP rull>, as U}J}Jlied to an
acrret.•mc·nt
that \\'as "ddicil•nt in tenus that would render
I::>
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it rnfon·l·able." Without the citation of authority this
eourt found that "an agret•ment to agree" was unenforc<.c•able. This court also held, as we read the opinion,
that the contract was unenforceable ''because of lack of
specificity of terms" and that the parol evidence rule
did not permit considPration of extrinsic evidence.
POINT II.
THE JUDGMENT IS AT VARIANCE WITH THE PLEADINGS AND THE PRETRIAL ORDER.

The judgment appealed from av·rnrds l)laintiff a
10% inten:•st in all the leases and mineral interests held
hy vValton-Kearns as of May 31, 1965 and an accounting
is ordered to determine the amount owing by defendants
to plaintiff on the sale of leases or mineral interests held
by the partnership as of the date last mentioned. The
accounting is to be based upon the gross sales price. The
plaintiff is awarded an undivided 10% interest in all
leases and mineral interests held by the partnership as of
May 31, 1965 and not sold as of the date of the judgment
regardless of whether the lease or mineral interest as
held rPflects any 01\·11ership by 11laintiff (R. 58).
Paragraph G of the findings indicates that the theory
of judgment in favor of the plaintiff is taken from "the
testimony'' of plaintiff and of defendant Walton and
which kstirnony is characterized as revealing that plaintiff frorn .January 2, 19G2 and thereafter until he terminated his Pmployrnent "was the ownPr of a ten percent
inten~st of the interest ltdd ])y the partnership in all
ll'asPs and mineral inb:'n·sts whether the same reflected
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any owuer:::d1ip by tlH· plaintiff or \Y('l'l~ held in the mum'
or names of the plaintiff or others." (R 54).
1'he foregoing is contrasted with parngraph 9 of
the amended com1Jlaint ::rnd particularly the portion thereof where plaiuti±'!' relates the acccounting to assets held
by the lmrtnen>hip on January 2, 1%2, "or the cash or
replacement assets purchased or reeeived from the sale
or trade of assets held by it on January 2, 1%2, the relationship of the parties since January 2, 19G2, being that
of tenants in common in said assets. The interest claimed
by plaintiff vested in him as to those prnperties held by
the partnership as of January 2, 1962, on that date, and
as to those propertie8 acquired after said date, on the
date of acquisition by the partnership" (R 9-10).
Paragraph 5 of the amended complaint predicate8 the
rdief demanded upon the January 2, 19G2 writing (R. 9).
Also, it ~was stipulated in the pretrial conference and the
pretrial order so indicates that the plaintiff's action was
based upon the writing dated January 2, 1962 (R. 40-44).
No theory of a contract separate and distinct from the
writing was presented or retServed in the pretrial order.
rrhe issues of law specified in the pretrial order relate
solely to the legal consequence and effect of the January
2, 19G2 writing (R. 41). A8 is customary and appropriate, and in accordance with Rule lG, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the final sentence of the pretrial order specifies:
Jt is ordered that this pretrial order ma)' be modified at the trial of the action ur p1·ior theretu to
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prevent manifest injustice and that this pretrial
order, as subsequently modified, if such modification is made, shall supersede the pleadings herein and govern the trial of this action (R. 44). (Emphasis added) .
lt has already been pointed out that the court specifically held the January 2, 1962 writing to be so vague
as to be unenforceable and that it was not supported by
consideration (R. 54). 'l'herefore, plaintiff bases whatever he thinks he is entitled to not upon a writing but
upon his testimony and the testimony of Paul T. Walton.
The finding (No. G, R. 54) is rather skimpy so far as a
factual statement is concerned, but we must assume that
it is intended thereby to set forth a factual basis for
recovery entirely different from the theory with respect
to the January 2, 1962 writing propounded by the plaintiff in his plPadings and madP a part of the pretrial

order.
In the instant case there has been the widest possible
deviation from the pretrial order, the pleadings supplanted thereby, and the judgment. rrhe new and different
theory was subsequent to the actual trial of the cause and
there was no effort to amend either the pleadings or the
pretrial order.
In Reliance National Life Insurance Company v.
Hansen, 15 Utah 2d 400, 393 P.2d 793 (1964) it was held
that the plaintiff could not interject "at the eleventh
hour'' findings as to deceit, an issue not covered by the
pretrial order. 'l'he court stated:
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"vVe think the is!:iue wa!:i ieed in tlw pretrial
order, being 'termination for cause,' not resci!:ision
for fraud. Although the September finding!:i talked about fraud, it based its judgment on termination 'for cause,' a conclusion it consistently had
<'!:i}JOU!:il'd iu S('h·ral pn'\·ions jndgrnents and
amendments thereto."

In Rumsey c. ::Juli Lake City, 16 Utah 2d 310, -1:10
P.2d 205 ( 1905) it was held that the trial court cannot
deviate from the pretrial order after the trial of the action and tliat nnder Rule lii, Utah Rules of CiL:il Procednre, the prl'trial order eannot be rnodifiPcl at tlH' trial
except to prevent manifest injustice.

In Citi.zens Casualty C01npany of New York v. Hackett, 17 Utah 2d 304, 410 P.2d 767, the ruling of the trial
court refusing i!:i;,;ues not covered by the pretrial order
was sustained obviously on the point that Rule 16 has a
definite meaning and purpose. The purpose of the definitive pretrial order is stated in United States of America
v. An Article of Dr·ug, etc., Acnotabs, 207 F. Supp. 758
(D.N.J. 1962) as follows:
'"l'he pmpo!:ie of a definitive pretrial order
is to make specific the legal theories on which each
party is proceeding and to crystallize and fornrnlate the issues to be tried. * * * 'rhere was no
ap]Jlication by claimant to amend the pretrial
order at any time prior to or during the trial of
the case, and, at this time, the right to inject a
ne\v issue must be denied."
To t11<'

331

S<llll('

F.~cl 5~1

dfrd is IVir/,(ji11., r. Cit.If of Philudclphiu,

(:3d Cir. 1%4) wlH•re the eourt ;:.;tated:
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"'l'o have pvrmitted him to have asserted a
position by daiming deficiency in design
\\ oul<l impair tlw dt'ieae:> of tlw prt>trial eonf PrencP prnt'edm·p and would ha\·e bet>n rnanifesth·
unfair to thP City. Th trial jndgP ruled eorrectl)·
in Pxclnding evidtmce based on such a theory."

JH'\\.

POINT III.
THE MINERAL INTERESTS AND LEASEHOLDS
AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF REQUIRED A WRITING UNDER
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

Throughout the proceedings the terms "leasehold
interests," ''overridt>s," "reversionary interests," "working intPrests" and ''mineral interests" are used by the
parties as descri1Jtive of various types of interests premised upon the n::mal oil and gas lease. In Judy u. Lent.z,
149 N.\V. :2d 478 (Mich. 1967) it was held that an oral
contract for obtaining certain oil and gas leases for defendants was void under the Statute of Frauds, the agreerm~nt not being in writing.
'l'he Michigan statute cited by the court in Judy 1.i.
Lentz, supra, is t'omparable to Section 25-5-4, Utah Code
.Amwtated (1953), which provides in part as follows:
"ln the following cases every agreement shall
he void unless such agreement, or some note or
mPmorandnm thereof, is in writing subscribed by
the party to be charged therewith:
*

*

*

( 5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real
estate for compensation."
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r:l'he cm;e of Kesler 'U. Ca::;elJolt, 278 8.vV. 2d 325
('L'ex. 1954) holding that a LrohTagt~ c:ontrad in obtaining
and buying designated oil and gas leases was required
to be in writing under the Statute of Frauds is annotated in 4 Oil and Gas Reporte1, 1381. r:l'he annotator
stated:
"As held in the prinC'ipal c:ase, Article 3995a,
Texas Rev. Civ. Statutes, which was promulgated
in 1939, requires that a brokerage contract involving a mineral or oil and gas leasehold interest providing for a commission must be in writing as a
prerequisite to enforcing the claim for a commission. This is but an extension of the Statute of
Frauds to oil and gas transactions. The defense
that such an instrument is not in writing is an affirmative defense; hence, the burden of asserting
the defense is on the defendant. Conversely, if
the defense is not asserted by the defendant, the
fact that the contract for a commission is oral
will not preclude recovery thereof."

In Enyeart u. Board of Sitpervisors, 427 P.2d 509
(Calif. 1967) it vms held that the word ''land" included
leasehold estates for the production of gas, petroleum
and other hydrocarbon substances from beneath the
surface of the earth and that such was consistent in terms
of the common law classification in California and tht>
applicable statutory materials. There is an extensive
annotation following the Enyeart case in 26 Oil and Gas
Reporter, 625, on the nature of rights created under oil
and gas il,asPs. 'l'lil' annotator calls attPntion to the fad
that in California, m; in other jurisdictions, there was a
period of uncertainty as to the nature of oil and gas inter-
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esh; in tlw developnH:nt of oil and gas jurisprudence.
At one stage in the legal history of oil and gas leases,
separate interests in oil and gas were treated as personalty rathe1· than realty. At present, however, interests
in oil and gas an~ usually heated as interests in real
property.

Willimn.-; w1d Meyer.-;, Oil llnd Ga.-; Law, Volume 1,
Section 214, lists the various classifications of interests
in oil and gas by states. The 1967 Cumulative Supplement
cites Cha.-;e v. Morgan, 9 Utah 2d 125, 339P.2d1019 (1959)
as classifying oil and gas leases as real estate within the
meaning of the statute governing licensing of real estate
brokers. In Chase i:. Morgan, the court stated:
"U ndetached minerals are part of the earth
and therefore realty."
Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953) relating
to the Statute of Frauds as pertains to an estate or interest in real property provides:
''No estate or interest in real property, other
than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor
any trnst or po\ver over or concerning real propl'I't!· or in an!' rnannPr relating thereto, shall be
created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law,
or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed
by the party creating, granting, assigning, surl'Pndering or declaring the same, or by his lawful
agent, thereunto authorized by writing.
rrhe applicable Statute of Frauds can be pleaded
defensinl!r to the claim that the plaintiff has an interest
created by some oral contract with the defendant Walton.
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'rhesl' and other matkrn wen~ pointed out lJy dcfendanb'
motion for ne\v trial 01· in the alternative for amendmenfa
of judgment and other relief (H. lil-(j;)) whidt motion \\'as
ovenuled and denied (R 66).
POINT IV.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF.

Paragrn1Jh 7 of the findings (IL 54) is tu the d'fed
that priol' to Jan nary 2, 19G2 the plaintiff had a 5% interest in the partnen;hi1J of Walton-Kearns. 'rhis finding
is not supported by the evidence. Defendants' answer to
the amended complaint call~·d attention to an undivided
3/lOOths ~working interest in favor of vlainhff which was
confirmed in writing under date of November 1, 1955
(R. 12-13). Defendants alleged on information and belief
that plaintiff had succ<~eded to a 2% similar interest
originally in favor of Honwr H. Hagins. These interests
are characterized as "carried working" interests. At the
hearing in September, 19G7, plaintiff disclaimed an,v
writing co\·ering the alleged 5% interest and disclaimed
any assignment from Hagins (R. 192)). The claim of a
5% interest is therefore based upon "conversation" with
defendant Walton (H. 192) and this we contend to be
wholly insufficient.
Finding No. Ii (H. G4) finds plaintiff to lw tlw
owner "of a ti~n per cent interest of the interest held
by tlw partrn·rshi p" in all leas<•s and mineral interests
and that s1wh is basc•d npon th<> kstimony of the plaintiff
and of tlH· defendant Walton. F'inding No. G states that
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the tPstiinonv. "reveals'' the interest no\v claimed by
.
plaintiff and whid1 is carried forward into the judgment.
The word "reyeals" is a :mhth-' expression and gives little
assistance as a determination of f(lct. In any event, the
reYeiation mnst concern itself with a contractual situation separate and apart from the January 2, 1962 writing
because in Findings 4 and 5 the comt fonnd that >vriting
to be unenforceable.
Whatever the ::;C'l'ivener had in mind as having heen
"revealed" by the testimony at the 8eptember 1967 heari11g, the fact of the matter is that the testimony was dir<:>cted solely to the intention of the parties as related to
the January 2, 1962 writing, and nev<:>r in express terms
to a search for a st>parate verbal promise. Counsel ref <:>rring to J£xhihi t D-4 put answ<:>rs in the mouth of defendant Walton:
"Q.

Your testimony today is that after this meeting in Mr. Gustin's office Mr. Guinand
brought 'Exhibit D-4,' the one you have in
your hand, hack to his office, made the
~·hanges. and hronght it to you and said, 'This
is what I want.' Is that your testimonyf

A.

'l'hat is generally it, yes.
Q. You said it is all right with you and go down
and talk it over with Harley~
A. 1 said, 'Yon will haw to clear it with
HarleY.' I didn't say it was all right with me.
I said·, 'If it is all rig·ht ·with Harley, it is all
right with me.'" (R. 162).
Not onh- clot's thP conCl'lJt of a different contract
u ffrrnl against the parol p\·idence rnle bnt the so-called
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different eontrad is as vulul'rnble to thP ddensl' of 110
consideration as is the writing of January 2, 1962. 'l1he
findings do not attempt to suvport the ::>o-ealled 10 <;o
agreement that i::; said io havl' bel~ll "revealed" by the
"testimony'' of plaintifi and defendaut Walton by a
stated eonsiderati(\11 and there i::; none ::;lwwn by the
record.
The eOIH.:l:pt of tc1wucy ill Jmrt1u'rshi11 preelude::; au
a::;signrnent in ::>pecifie partnership propert~· except in
connection with tlw a::;::;ignrnent of right::; of all tlw
parties in the ::;ame protwdy. 'l'hi::; i::; reiterakd in the
Uniform Partnershiv Act, Seetion -±8-1-22 (2) (b), Utah
Code Annotated ( 1953). The philoso1)hy of the rule is
stated in 1 Rowley 011 Purtncrship (2d Ed.) at iiage 5lil
to the effect that all a partrn·r has, subject to his power
of indi\·idual di::o1)ositio11, and all that is subjeet to the
claims of hi::o separate ereditorn, i::o hi::o interest, not in
specific partnership property, but in the vartnership itself. '11lie partnership prn1wrty is kept intact for imrtnership imrposes aud creditors. The statutory incident:-;
of the partrn:n:;hip eo-knanc.\· are attached thereto for
that purpm;e, "whicl1 will be }JUJ tw1to thwarted as effect
is given to an attempted disposition of a partiwr's intt•rest
in specifie partrn•rship prnperty. '11 hl· aim of the ::otatute
is to rn·ev\'nt snch an assigmrn·nt. 'rhl· only way, therefore,
to app]~- it aeC'onling- to its plain purpose is to nullify
all atternJ1ts at such assigmuents."
supnt, m the same section
and at thl· sallll' pagl' ill rnaking U1e positive statl>ment
J-fowley

1n1 Purt111't.'J1ijJ,
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that no imrtnl'l' has thP right or power to dispose of or
to apvl:- vartnPrshi11 prnp('l't:- for his own use or indi,·idnal ht•ndit without the rnnsPnt of his eo-partners
mab~s the following statement:

"He does not ltavP the vower of disposal; he
has no proportionate share since his interest in the
partnership is his sharp of the JH"ofits and surplus,
and the natnre of a partner's lien which requires
that partnership propert:- be finally applied in
discharge of tlw debt:-o and liabilities of the com1110n bnsines:-o prt>vents it. This applies also to use
of the firm funds and to payments of money belonging to it. "l1he title to partnership property
is not in the individual members of the firm so
that either may assign or tram;fer to another an
undivided share in an:- specifie articles, but it is in
the firm as an entirety, subject to the right of the
partners to have it ap1Jlied to the payment of the
debts of tlw firm and the equities of the 1mrtners.'
No single parhwr ean transfer an undivided interPst in an:· iiartieular ]Jieee of firm property."
'L1he tenancy in partrn~rship doctrine is especially
applicable to 'l'hornas F. Kearns not only during his lifetime but also after his death. Tn the instant record the
onl:- time that Mr. Kearns eonsented to anything and
tlw only t>\'idence of eonst>nt on his part is the writing of
.January 2~ 19G2. 'l'lw \\Titing was cast aside by the trial
eourt and the jndgrnPnt now in favor of the plaintiff is
based on tht> tt•stimony of deft>ndant \\Talton and of the
plaintiff. Nowllen' in tlH~ n·eord d0<:~s defendant Walton
puqJOrt to s1wak for his lJartner 'l'hornas :E'. Kearm;
wl10sP death was noted by the pretrial order and the
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J~xec11tor, \\' alk('}' Baiik ,\: 'l'rnst Corn pan.'·, snl)stitutt>d

in his st<·ad (IL +:3--1-±.)

J>Jaintiff is t<mfrnntecl with tlw

additional bmd<·11 of showing s11eeific authority on the
iiart of Paul T. \Yultun to t01rn11it tlw imrtrn·rsltip inkr<'8t, which autll()rit\ 11 ould lHtv<· to <·omc· frorn tlte copartn\'l' Tl10rnas l•'. K.<·arns. Nc·etio11 ±8-1-7, Utah Code
~1wwtatl'd ( L95>l) prnvid<·s in Jiart a;-; follows:
"\Vla~re titk to real prnp<·rt.\· is in the 11a11H·
of om· or more but not all of t}H· pal"trn·rs, and th<'
n·cord doe;-; not disclose· th<' right of the partnership, th<' parbwrs in 11·ltosP 11aJllP th<• title stanch;
ma:-· conn·.'· titl<' to ;-;ndt prnp<'rty, but tlu_, partnt>rshi1J may reeo\·pr snel1 prnperty, if the partners'
act doPs not bind tl1e partnPrshi p under the provisions of Nedio11 48-1-0(1) ~·**."
~t>ction

-18-1-!i( 1) n•frrn·d tu abo\·<· provides:

"(l) 1£\·ery partne1· is an agent of the partfor the purpo:w of its lnrniness, and tltt'
act of ever:< parhwr, inelmling the ext>c11tion ill
t}ip partnl'l"8hip llalll<' of an.'· instnu11e11t for aIJparentJ.'; carr:-·!11g mi i11 tlw nsual ,,.a.'· the busint>ss
of tlw 1mrtnt>rslti p of which he i:o a member, hinds
tl!P partn<->rship, u11le:-:-: the partner so adi11g has
in fact no autlwrit.'· to act for the partnership iu
tlw particular rnatt<->r and tll<' 1wrson with ·whom
ltv is dealing has kno\\'lvdgc of tit<' fact that hP has
no such authority."
m~rshi p

It

\\'a;-;

<·stablish<·d at all <•tul.\ dat<~ in thi:o jurisdiction

that a piaintiH who;-;<· adim1 is ha:oed upon a transaction
\\·ith an

indi,·idllal part11n, ,,·ltieh transaction is not

"ealT\·ino·
011 in tlw u;-;1ml \\a\.
tlw Jn1;-;i1w:os of tit<• partuPr•
CJ
•
ship" Jia:o th<• )Jttl"ll\'ll of sho\\ i11g th<• partJH'J" \\·it}1 wltolll
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he has tnrnsach·d business has ::;1wcific authority to act
for the othl'r partner::;. ln Pet<'rso11 c. Arm.strong, 24 Utah
9(i, ()() P. 7G7 (1901), the court ::;tated:
"'l'lw law i::; well settled that a partner without
special authority, ha::; no power to bind the firm
in any trammetion which is without the ordinary
or ap1iart>nt ::il'OlW of the partnership bu::;ines::;.
Of this the plaintiff wa::; hound to take notice, and,
having entered into a transaction with one partner,
which wa::; not, a::; dearly ap1Jears from both the
pleading::; and proof, within ::;uch ::;cope, and having
brought thi::; ::;nit to e::;tablish liability on the part
of the otlwr partners, the burden was upon her
to show either that tht> eontracting partner had
::;pecial authority, or that tht> transaction was
afterwards ratifi<.>d b)· the other partners whom
::;he seeks to hold liable. We are of the opinion
that the proof diselo::;ed by the record is wholly
inadt>quak to show either svecial authority or
ratification."
C(tuwauyh 1·. b'ali.slntry, 03 P. 39 (Utah 1900);
Gitthid c. Gilmer, ()3 P. 817 (Utah 1901). Section 48-1-6
(2), Utah Code A111wtatcd (1953) similarly provides:
~Pe

"(2) An aet of a partner which is not apparently for the carr)·ing on of the business of the
partnership in tlw nsual way does not bind the
partnership, unless anthorizPd b.v the other partners."
rl'lw findings, and partienlarly Finding No. 0, (R 54.)
not only fail to :-show that tht> nt>cessary authority had
h<>en gi\'en h~· the ('o-partnPr 'rlwrna:-s F. Kt>arns but inject
thL· Plement of uttl"l" eon fusion in tlw statPrnent that plaintiff \\·a::; "from at lea::;t January :2, 1902 * ~, * the owner
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of a kn JWI' (Tnt intt>rvst of tltP int1Tv~t hdd h,\' the partnership in all lvasl'S and mim•rnl intPresb whether the
same reflt>dt>d all.'' 0\1 nc·rship hy the plaintiff or were
held in the narne or lHiltlPS ot the plaintiff or others."
'l'he judgment (H. :SS) clouds i11tervsts held in the name
of Tlwmas F. Kl·ai'lts and others not parties to the
action b.'· paragraph ;3 and the language "'regardless of
whether the lea~w or mineral inten•st as hdd reflect::;
any ownership by plaintiff."
1£xhibits P-5, P-G and P-7 are examples of the resulting eonfusion of titll', partieularly in the absence of
some ·writing or other adc•quate authority from 'l'homa::;
F. Kearns. Plaintiff has failed to earry the burden of
lJroof necessary to hind the partnership to the purported
oral conn•yanee said to have been committed by Paul 'l'.
Walton in favor of the plaintiff. 'l'he record does not di::;close that Thomas F. Kearns ever consented to the tran::;action, or ratified or otht>rwise authorized it. '11 he transaetion was not one in the· ordinary com·sp of partnership
business.
r:l'his eourt should n•verse for the reason alone that
there is no sufficient e\'idenee to support paragraphs 6
and 7 of the findings or paragraph :2 of the conclusions
or the jwlguwnt 1vitlt n·s1Ject to the allt'ged interest.

CONCLUSION
'l'hP incon~istuncy lwt\YePn tlw jndg-uwnt as entered
011 Non·rnlH'r J, 1!Hi7 and t1w trial eourt's llH'lllOrandmu
deeisiou oi' ~epkrnfwr rn, l!J(i/, 11·itl10nt any intervening
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hiparty <lisellssion, analysis or eourt sandion of record
lr>a v<>s tlw t>nti rt' proet>t>ding vlllnerable to serious and
hasie <1 llestions of judieial regularity. By this we mean
that the end [Joint arrind at hy the trial judge cannot be
rntionalizt>d from th<' n•tord or hy an)· aeet>pted standard
of jndieial proeeeding. These matters were pointed out
by the motion for new trial whieh in turn was IJeremptori ly denied (B. GG). The judgment as entered by the lower
c~onrt has no rPlationshiv to the pleadings or to the pretrial ordl'r. On tlw fate of things, the judgment appealed
from is not the result but is the Pxact opposite of due
process. 'J'he cause should be remanded with such directions as to this court may seem proper and if a new
theory is to be advanct>d, the parties should be permitted
to n~cast their pk,adings in the as::;ertion and defense
thereof.
Uespectfully submitted,
HARL.BJY

w.

GUtrrrN

()f counsel for Defendant-Appell(lllf
P·aul T. Walton dba Walton-Kearns
J. WENDELL BAYLES

Of Counsel for Walker Bank &
Trust Company as Execidor of the
Estate of Thornas F. Kearn:::;,
Decea:::;ed.
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